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Introduction
Across the United States, the concept of environmental justice has been gaining ground. Initially
defined in the negative – a reduction in the disproportionate exposure of minority residents to
various hazards – environmental justice advocates often took as a first task raising awareness of
environmental disparities both nationally and locally. In this effort, activists have had success at
changing policies as well as projects. In 1994, for example, President Clinton acknowledged the
issue in a Presidential Executive Order directing all federal agencies to take into account the
potentially disproportionate burdens on U.S. minority communities of pollution or hazard siting.
In 1998, the Southern California Air Quality Management District created a local Task Force
on Environmental Justice, partly in response to a lawsuit filed by community advocates who
contended that the District’s permit trading system was leading to “hot spots” in minority
neighborhoods.1
While these policy victories have been primarily directed at reducing harm or ameliorating
inequities, environmental justice (EJ) also can offer hope for a more positive and harmonious
vision of the social good. That is, claiming the right to clean air and water can be the beginning
of a community movement to deploy natural assets in the service of community-based wealth
creation (as in the community food strategies profiled by Raquel Rivera Pinderhughes (2001)).
Indeed, the assertion that communities deserve equity in their access to a healthy environment
can lead to similar assertions with regard to the distribution of other social resources, such as
schools, housing, open space, and employment. The resulting equitable distribution of other
social commodities can feed back to help the environment itself: recent research has
demonstrated that lower levels of inequality are associated with higher levels of environmental
protection, presumably because the fairer distribution of power makes it difficult to place
hazards in someone else’s backyard and thus enhances the incentives to engage in either source
reduction or clean up at the regional and state levels (see Boyce et al. 1999; Morello-Frosch
1997).
This paper argues that our understanding of the EJ movement and its positive spillover effects
can be enhanced if we highlight the central role of social capital in both triggering environmental
inequity and producing environmental justice. Such an emphasis on social capital is not meant to
diminish the other positive effects of the EJ movement. Where successful, the EJ movement has
(at least relatively) protected health and thereby improved resident well-being, human capital,
and labor productivity (see, for example, Environmental Health Coalition 1998). EJ groups have
also had significant impacts on productive capital, particularly through the collaboration with
business and public officials on “brownfield” revitalization (see U.S. EPA 1996).
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Still, social capital plays a critical and special role. One of the reasons for the disproportionate
exposure of some groups to environmental hazards is a relative lack of social power and social
capital, that is, an inability to garner the political clout necessary to resist hazard siting and the
isolation of some communities from others. Because of this, a key element in achieving
environmental justice is the building of both “bonding” social capital that can unify or bring
communities together and “bridging” social capital that can link these communities with each
other and with potential allies. The resulting increase in social capital can, in turn, have positive
impacts on both the environment and community development, both directly in affected
communities and more broadly across economic regions.
This paper develops these arguments as follows: I first discuss the national-level evidence on the
pattern of environmental inequity. Given the flurry of political and policy activity around
environmental injustice, one would imagine that the existence of inequity was a firmly established
fact. In fact, the social science research on this topic is quite mixed, with some authors
purporting to show clear proof of environmental inequities and others suggesting that the
seemingly racial patterns of exposure are either coincidence or primarily market-driven.2
The second section discusses a set of studies about the Los Angeles area I have conducted with
a series of colleagues, especially Jim Sadd of Occidental College. I demonstrate that in L.A.,
Latinos and African Americans face nearly twice the exposure levels of Anglos, and note that
differences in exposure remain even after controlling for income, population density, and other
reasonable variables. I then outline some of our research on the intertemporal dimensions of
hazard siting, suggesting that explanations rooted in terms of political power tend to offer more
explanatory power than accounts simply based on market dynamics. Finally, I note how
changing demographics – a potential signal of weakened social capital – can make a community
especially vulnerable to siting.
In the third section, I explore the role of social capital in more detail. After noting how social
capital may play a key role in whether a hazard will be sited in a neighborhood, I then focus on
the opposite direction of causality: how the attempt to clean up the local environment – that is,
to diminish the use of certain neighborhoods as the primary sinks for wastes – can lead to
localized political empowerment and more social capital. Noting that there is actually little
evidence that jobs must be sacrificed to reduce pollution in our study area of Lost Angeles, I
suggest instead how EJ mobilizations can feed into a community-building approach. I then
discuss how spreading the burden of sinks and the benefits of appropriation can in turn have
positive direct and indirect impacts on a community’s and region’s natural assets.
The final section of the paper concludes by restating the central argument and considering how
the social momentum and social capital generated by EJ organizing is increasingly being
deployed to tackle a variety of community development challenges. I suggest, in particular, that
as individuals, families, and neighborhoods learn to assert their property rights over the
“commons,” they may also begin to demand improved access to the various public goods (such
as schools, economic opportunity, and safety) that are necessary for asset-based community
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development. Thus, EJ activism can be an important part of the general community-building
movement.
Research On Environmental Inequities
While a 1983 study by the Government Accounting Office was one of the first significant studies
of the distribution of environmental negatives, the United Church of Christ (UCC) study of 1987
is considered the landmark study by many activists. The study seemed to offer clear-cut findings
that toxic facilities were disproportionately located in minority communities, a result which lent
credence to social movements which had emerged out of a set of landmark protests in Warren
County, North Carolina in 1982 when a largely African-American and rural community was
chosen as the site for burial of a PCB landfill (Bullard 1994).3
However, just as the environmental justice movement was gaining traction – with the First
People of Color Environmental Leadership conference held in Washington, DC in October
1991, the adoption of the Presidential Executive Order in 1994, the formation of an activistinfluenced National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee within the EPA, and the
adoption of environmental justice as an issue by some mainstream environmentalist organizations
(such as the Environmental Defense Fund; see Sandweiss 1998) – the academic basis for
environmental inequity was being challenged. Indeed, the relative disconnection between the
strength of the social movement and the sometime ambiguity of the available evidence has led
some to attack EJ as lacking a scientific foundation (Foreman 1998).
The most important studies challenging the documentable basis of environmental inequity came
from sociologists based at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst.4 They criticized the earlier
UCC study on two grounds: (1) the UCC study took zip codes as its unit of analysis, areas
which are both large and not necessarily reflective of community-defined boundaries, and (2)
the important associations that UCC researchers made between hazards and race were based
on simple bivariate correlations (that is, relationships between two variables without
consideration of the impact of a third). The latter criticism was especially significant since it
suggested that racial differences in exposure might no longer be salient once controls were
introduced for income, access to industry, and other relevant explanatory factors.
Using a more geographically compact unit, the census tract, as well as a multivariate approach,
the UMass researchers offered a series of studies which demonstrated that the key factors
associated with the placement of one form of hazard, toxic storage and disposal facilities, were
income, population density, the proximity of manufacturing employees, and other variables –
and that when these were taken into account, race generally did not have an independent impact
(see Anderton et al. 1994a, 1994b). These national-level findings have been criticized for both
methodological reasons and data inadequacies (see Been 1995; Bullard 1996). Still, the work
included some substantial methodological advances over previous research – and the results
called into question the basis of EJ concerns, particularly around race.
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The importance of the central Anderton et al. finding – that income matters but race does not –
should be stressed. From an ethical viewpoint, disparate impacts on the poor would be
sufficient grounds for concern: if certain income groups are seeing their natural assets diminished
by their transformation of their communities into environmental sinks, then this reflects an
inequity which should be addressed. However, within the U.S. legal context, racial minorities
are a protected category under federal law and the poor are not.5 Thus, for many poor
communities, finding a disproportionate exposure by race is the only way to seek a public policy
remedy; if environmental inequity is primarily distributed across lines of class rather than race,
then this may accepted by a society which views the poor as simply the inevitable losers in a
market system.
Indeed, some analysts have suggested that it is precisely market dynamics that determine the
location of wastes: polluters are attracted to areas with low land values, and in turn, communities
with low levels of economic activity are more likely to seek or accept such facilities as they try
to encourage economic development (Been 1994). Thus, the Anderton et al. results are
“rational”: if income matters, but race is insignificant, then the market is simply working its usual
magic.
The Anderton et al. findings have been challenged by other researchers who have utilized better
address data and more sophisticated Geographic Information System (GIS) and statistical
techniques.6 While the results have been somewhat mixed, the bulk of the evidence points in the
direction of inequity by class and race (see Been 1995; Szasz and Meuser 1997). Still, the
dynamics of the market rather than politics might be present: Could it be that minorities and the
poor are “attracted” to hazards by virtue of low housing costs that incorporate or internalize the
environmental disadvantages? Does the apparent pattern of inequity simply reflect consumer
choice rather than racial discrimination in siting?
Determining whether hazards were placed in minority communities or whether minority residents
moved to these areas has important implications for an asset-based view of community
development. Imagine that a neighborhood receives a new undesirable land use: as a result,
wealthier residents depart and newer, poorer residents with a different set of risk-income tradeoff preferences arrive to take their place. A statistical snapshot across the relevant region, no
matter how multivariate, will show environmental inequity even though the whole process simply
reflected a desire to maximize one sort of asset, housing, by substituting it for another, access to
clean air and low-risk environments.7
Determining causality is also important for policy. If there really is a significant demographic
transition after the siting of a hazard, then an environmental justice policy with regard to siting
would be futile. Moreover, suppose that social protest leads local regulators or operators to
improve their environmental record. If housing values then rise, this could lead to an exodus of
poorer residents – in which case, measured socioeconomic variables for the local geography
will improve, but only because of gentrification and displacement. This would represent little
advance for the poor who were previously forced to suffer the negative externality – and it
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would hardly fit the character of an asset-based community development whose goal is to uplift,
not uproot, the poor.
What does the national research tell us about placement versus move-in? The University of
Massachusetts researchers (Oakes, Anderton, and Anderson 1996) find that there is no
evidence that hazards were placed in minority or poor neighborhoods but also find no significant
demographic post-siting transition. Been and Gupta (1997) find no evidence of significant postsiting change in racial or ethnic composition, but they do find that Latino communities may be at
special risk for siting. They also find that it is not the poorest areas that receive hazards – and
since these areas later become poor, it could be that some of the poverty population indeed
moves in, a pattern consistent with the market-oriented story.
In broad terms, however, the evidence has failed to settle the debate between a market
framework which stresses choice and demographic change and a political approach which
stresses unequal power and access to the decision-making process (see Hamilton 1995). In the
next section, we consider some specific evidence from one urban area, Los Angeles; as we will
see, the results there tend to support a more political view and also seem to reflect the role of
social capital in constructing resistance to environmental negatives.
Environmental Inequities in the Los Angeles Area
In a series of papers, several colleagues and I have argued that much of the national-level work
reviewed above is flawed for methodological reasons, including improper variable specification
and problematic data sets (Boer et al. 1997; Sadd et al. 1999; Pastor et al. 1999). Perhaps
most relevant is our argument that such distributional studies are more appropriately conducted
at the regional level. After all, if industrial clusters are regional, so should be the distribution of
waste: since furniture manufacturing is unlikely to move from Los Angeles to Seattle and
Microsoft is unlikely to leave Washington for the Southland, we must consider who bears the
brunt of the solvent-using furniture industry where it actually exists and will likely remain.
What have we found in our work on Los Angeles? First, in a multivariate regression which has
as its dependent variable whether or not a particular census tract contains or is near a toxic
storage facility, race does matter even after we take into account income, industrial land use,
and local manufacturing employment. Moreover, the income effect is actually U-shaped – the
poorest communities are spared as are the richest, with the most likely places to find such toxic
facilities being working-class communities of color (Boer et al. 1997). The reason, we suggest,
is a mix of economics and politics: in some very poor communities, the low level of economic
activity correlates with low pollution levels; meanwhile, those at the top end of the distribution
have sufficient political power to resist various locally undesirable land uses (LULUs).
Parallel regressions using data from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) yielded a similar set of
relationships: even controlling for other factors, race influences the probability that a particular
census tract will have a TRI release. We also found that the degree of toxicity of the releases
rises with percent minority and increases in the other key variables.8 Income again takes a U-
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shape, suggesting that the communities most suffering the effects of environmental injustice are
working class, minority areas. Interestingly, it is exactly these areas that have been the focus of
EJ organizing in Los Angeles, implying that such organizers have been appropriate in their
targeting.
Figure 1 shows how this unequal distribution of risks plays out in terms of relative “exposure
rates,” as measured by the percent of all Anglos, African-Americans, and Latinos in the broader
Southern California area who live in a census tract containing one of three potential hazards: a
toxic storage and disposal facility, an air release which contains elements on the 33/50 list of
high-priority (and usually carcinogenic) toxics especially targeted for reduction by the EPA, or a
general air release listed in the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). As can be seen there,
Latinos have the highest likelihood of being in a tract with these hazards and Anglos have the
lowest, with the African-American probability being in between.

Figure 1: Exposure by Group to Environmental
Negatives in Southern California
Figure charts the
percentage of group
living in a tract with the
specified release. For
example, 5.4% of
Southern California
Anglos live in a tract
with a 33/50 release but
10% of southern
California Latinos live in
such a tract.

Percent of Group

20%
15%
10%

Living in Tract with TRI Air Release

5%
Living in Tract with 33/50 Release

0%
Anglos

Living in Tract with Toxic Disposal

African American
Latino

What about placement versus move-in? To explore this issue, we obtained the dates when
various toxic storage and disposal facilities (TSDFs) were located in the County of Los
Angeles. We geo-coded these address-date pairs (visiting a sample to check actual facility
locations) and then drew both ¼ mile and 1 mile circles around the site point to capture
potentially affected areas. We then obtained a database which carried 1990 census tract shapes
back through the 1980 and 1970 censuses, that is, that rearranged certain demographic data
from those years to fit the 1990 shapes, creating a spatially consistent time series at the census
tract level.9
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The simplest way to understand the results is through a series of t-test comparisons of means.
Table 1 compares the 1970 demographics for tracts in Los Angeles that were to receive an intract or proximate TSDF over the 1970-90 period to those tracts that did not. The results
suggest that the receiving areas were indeed more minority, poorer, more blue collar, and had
fewer home owners, lower initial home values and rents, and a lower percentage of collegeeducated residents. Population density was significantly lower for the ¼ mile zone, seeming to
reflect the sensible notion that such hazards should be sited in areas with a lower population, but
perhaps simply reflecting their siting in areas where an above-average fraction of the land is
devoted to industrial or other non-residential usage. Density is higher (albeit statistically
insignificant) at the one-mile level, a worrisome finding from a public health perspective.

Table 1
Comparison of the Average Characteristics of Tracts in 1970 That Would Receive a TSDF in 1970-90 With
All Other Tracts in Los Angeles County
TSDF Sited Within
TSDF Sited Within 1
1/4 Mile Between
Mile Between 19701970-90
90
County Average
Minority share (%)

53.2***

50.5***

31.8

African-American share (%)

25.7**

20.1***

10.8

Latino share (%)

22.0

25.4***

18.0

$8,197***

$8,742***

$10,032

$21,611***

$22,578***

$26,042

Median rent (monthly)

116***

121***

$138

College educated share (%)

7.9***

8.4***

12.6

Household income (annual)
Home value

Single Family Housing share (%)
Population density (persons per
square mile)

55.5**
6,849*

Blue collar share (%)
55.5***
*** Difference from all other tracts statistically significant at the .01 level
** Difference from all other tracts statistically significant at the .05 level
* Difference from all other tracts statistically significant at the .10 level

63.5

64.4

9,112

8,724

53.7***

46.1

What happened in these tracts after a TSDF arrived? Table 2 presents the changes over 197090 in tracts that received or were near TSDFs sited in 1960-70, as compared to tracts that did
not receive such hazards. As can be seen, the only changes of statistical significance were a
relative decline in the percentage of African-Americans and the blue-collar presence within the
one-mile zone, and a decline in the percentage of the college-educated in the most proximate
areas; note that there is a move-in of Latinos (albeit statistically insignificant), suggesting a
process of ethnic transition which we will explore below.10 The relative decline in blue-collar
workers may be of special interest, given the usual trade-off story in which such sites are said at
least to bring useful employment to local residents. However, these figures are for residents, not
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jobs, so that issue cannot be directly explored here; we tackle the jobs-pollution issue with a
different strategy below.
Table 2
Demographic Changes in Census Tracts Following a TSDF Siting vs. Tracts Without a TSDF Siting
Average Percentage Change from 1970 to 1990
TSDF Sited Within
TSDF Sited Within 1
1/4 Mile Between
Mile Between 19701970-90
90
County Average
Minority share (%)

24.8

23.7

African-American share (%)

-5.7

-3.6*

Latino share (%)

24.8

19.1

16.7

Household income

267%

278%

2756%

Home value

716%

808%

818%

Median rent

378%

373%

362%

9.6

9.4

-3.7

-4.7

-8.2*

-5.3

College educated (%)
Single family housing share (%)

5.5**
-1.7

Blue collar share (%)
-5.1
*** Difference from all other tracts statistically significant at the .01 level
** Difference from all other tracts statistically significant at the .05 level
* Difference from all other tracts statistically significant at the .10 level

24.6
0.2

Of course, as noted above, such simple tests can mask the underlying dynamics, and
multivariate strategies are therefore in order. For that reason, we developed a simple model of
TSDF placement and subjected it to a series of regression strategies. The results indicate that a
higher presence of minorities and lower income levels as of 1970 were indeed statistically
significant predictors (along with population density and a proxy for home ownership) of
whether a census tract (particularly with 1 mile) was to receive a hazard in the next twenty
years. This pattern supports the basic tenets of a political placement hypothesis: that is, the
notion that minorities and the poor may have been special targets for such facilities.11
Similarly, to explore the dynamics of move-in, we constructed a simple model of neighborhood
demographic change, and added to it a variable indicating whether the neighborhood had a
TSDF (within ¼ mile or 1 mile) as of 1970, and one indicating whether it had received a TSDF
during the 1960s. The effects were generally negative – that is, TSDFs led to minority moveout, not move-in – but the results were statistically insignificant. Recognizing that the processes
of siting and move-in may be happening quickly, we also tried a simultaneous equations
approach which took into account both the demographic changes and siting decisions over
1970-90. The results: the placement hypothesis dominated, and, controlling for all other factors,
the placement and/or existence of a hazard continued to have a negative, albeit statistically
insignificant impact on minority move-in.
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We then decided to go beyond the usual notion that minority presence per se leads to facility
placement and look at the major minority groups separately. We found that in Los Angeles,
census tracts were at peak vulnerability to a TSDF when their balance demographics were
roughly 48 percent Latino and 44 percent African-American, that is, when neighborhoods had a
rough balance between similarly disenfranchised groups. Since this balance is usually present
when communities are in transition, we decided to look at the degree of demographic change in
the immediate past – calculated by simply adding up the absolute values of the percentage shifts
in the demographics of the four largest groups – and found that this measure of “ethnic
churning” was a powerful predictor of the location of hazards.
Figure 2 maps this “ethnic churning” in Los Angeles County between 1970 and 1990 against
the siting of TSDFs over the same period; as can be seen visually, there is a strong correlation.
A detailed statistical profile reveals that there was a significant degree of ethnic change in the
decade prior to siting, with demographic transition slowing during and after siting. A
simultaneous multivariate technique yields similar results: ethnic churning is a strong predictor of
a concurrent siting of a TSDF, while TSDF siting has little effect on subsequent ethnic transition.
While these results do reveal some degree of post-siting move-in, our analysis suggests that the
neighborhood is simply completing a process of change that first brought new minorities and, in
their wake, new toxics.
Social Capital, Natural Assets, and Environmental Justice
While the patterns revealed in the L.A. research may seem complex, the general story is simple.
First, race and income seem to matter in explaining the contemporary distribution of hazards.
Second, there is strong evidence of disproportionate siting in minority neighborhoods but weak
and sometimes contradictory evidence with regard to minority move-in after siting, suggesting
that the contemporary pattern is due to inequity in siting decisions. Finally, one variable that has
a significant impact on the likelihood of receiving a hazard is the extent of ongoing demographic
change. Taken together, these results square better with a political explanation of TSDF siting
than with a market- or choice-driven analysis.
The fact that areas in the midst of demographic change are more likely to receive sites also
suggests the potential importance of social capital. In general, areas richer in social capital –
both informal networks and formal community organizations – are better able to advocate for
their needs, regardless of their level of other political and economic assets. Given the importance
of race in the construction of individual and community identity, it may be unsurprising that an
area that is nearly all African-American might be better able to resist a site than an area which is
mixed: intra-racial bonds, and invocations of a collective history of discrimination, can be used
to rally the community to its overall self-

.
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interest. By contrast, a rapidly changing social fabric can make communities less able to mount
resistance to siting decisions.
The resulting challenge – one that has been central to the EJ movement – is to build solidarity
and social capital across a multi-racial public. This social capital can take two forms: (1)
“bonding” social capital among those suffering the most environmental negatives, and (2)
“bridging” social capital that reaches out for support from other communities. “Bonding”
involves building connections within a community via organizing, a task often facilitated by the
immediacy of the health issue, and by the deep, visceral sense of evident injustice that
environmental inequity presents. Such bonding is often complicated by the need for inter-ethnic
organizing, but it is critical for protecting natural assets: as Cole (1992) notes, lawyers can help
communities win injunctions, but it is a mobilized community that will ensure enforcement and
thus protect the local environment.
EJ activists have also sought to build on “bridging” social capital, working to help minority
communities cultivate powerful allies in other communities. This task is facilitated by the fact that
the mainstream environmental movement has made progress in recognizing the importance of
environmental inequity, and by the general public’s moral sense that the environment is a public
good to which communities should have open and relatively equal access. As a result, the notion
of sharp disparities in the distribution of hazards – and the resulting uneven abilities to enjoy
natural assets such as clean air and water – is unpopular. Instances of environmental inequity
therefore present an opportunity to build alliances within and between disenfranchised
communities as well as with the broader public.
The ultimate reason for building this social capital is to influence policy to ensure that
communities are protected from unfair use of their wealth or assets. While the EJ movement has
not often articulated itself in these terms, we can easily see the movement as asserting
community property rights over the environmental sinks of air and water.12 Indeed, the policy
and political challenge for the EJ movement is to define more specifically the relevant property
rights (community control over the sinks) and the relevant boundaries (at the neighborhood or
regional level), and then to contest other forces (including both polluters and regulatory
agencies) about both these issues.
Within this framework, we can argue that environmental inequity arises when the community
property claim – that is, the right to determine how much pollution a neighborhood will tolerate,
and for what purposes – is appropriated by others, whether by the regulatory apparatus of the
state or by a particular firm. If a community experiences a localized environmental negative from
an activity for which benefits are widely dispersed (for example, when toxic by-products of
production that benefits an entire region are disposed of in one particular neighborhood), or if
the benefits are highly concentrated in another community (as when the profits and employment
opportunities engendered by waste firm operations accrue to individuals outside the local area),
the affected community bears environmental costs without receiving commensurate positive
benefits in return; this represents a violation of the community’s property rights.13
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On the other hand, to the extent that a community itself chooses to trade environmental integrity
for another goal, such as economic development, it is valuing the flow of benefits from one
asset, productive capital, above that from another asset, natural capital. In such a case, some
observers may not be as concerned about any apparent inequity in the distribution of
environmental hazards, on the grounds that the affected populations are being compensated by
employment and may be balancing health and jobs along their own collective “indifference
curves.”14 Others will argue that this sort of “vicious choice” reflects a trade-off with which no
community need be faced.
Have the disproportionately affected communities in Los Angeles at least gained jobs and other
benefits? To look at this question, I broke Los Angeles County into 58 different Public Use
Microdata Areas (PUMAs), a geographic frame used in the U.S. Census Bureau’s Public Use
Microdata Sample (see Figure 3). In L.A., the PUMAs are geographically compact, follow
recognizable community lines, and are of sufficient size to examine localized labor and retail
markets.15 The typical PUMA is about 22 square miles, with an average population in 1990 of
about 150,000 and slightly less than 80,000 jobs.
To examine the relationship between environmental costs and employment benefits, I then took
an estimate of the additional cancer risk from hazardous air pollutants in each PUMA, based on
the EPA’s Cumulative Exposure Index as developed by Rachel Morello-Frosch (1997).
Dividing the areas into three categories, ranging from least polluted to heavily polluted, I
calculated the percentage of minority residents against the rate of job growth in the 1980-94
period, based on data provided by the Southern California Association of Governments. The
racial disparities, depicted in Figure 4, are quite clear: the cancer risk due to air pollution and the
percent minority rise in tandem. The line in the figure shows the rates of job growth over the
1980-94 period: as can be seen, the higher the level of pollution, the lower the rates of
employment increase.16 In the most polluted areas, employment actually declined.
This pattern hardly recommends a toxic-based strategy for community development. It also
raises serious issues for a market-oriented story which claims that choices are being made by
communities along their self-selected indifference curves. After all, if communities are balancing
potential environmental risks against improvement in economic potential, they are clearly not
getting a very good deal. Instead, it looks like environmental degradation and economic
weakness go hand in hand.
The idea that there might be complementarities between various forms of capital – natural,
social, human, financial, and physical – is increasingly accepted by economic researchers.17
Consider, for example, how the mutually reinforcing character of natural and financial capital can
affect the extent of rain forest destruction through two mechanisms: (1) the financial poverty of
residents
can
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a
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.

.
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Figure 4: Pollution and Jobs: Is There a
Trade-off in Los Angeles County?
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which leads to overuse of natural assets (Kyle and Cunha 1992); and/or (2) the lack of wealth
and therefore social power of poor, forest-dependent communities weakens the resistance to
timber companies, mining firms, ranchers, and other outsiders who may seek to exploit natural
resources (Segura and Boyce 1994). In either case the solution is to increase a community’s
economic assets as a way to protect natural assets. As for social and productive capital, an
intriguing body of recent literature suggests that relative equality in the distribution of income
actually tends to enhance social consensus and improve overall economic policies and
performance in both countries and regions.18
What is the relationship between social capital and natural capital? As we have seen, the lack of
bonding social capital within a community can lead to environmental vulnerability; organizing, on
the other hand, can lead to direct improvements. Yet the bridging aspect of social capital may
be just as important for enhancing natural assets. In a recent dissertation, for example, Rachel
Morello-Frosch (1997) offers a startling finding: using a cancer risk variable based on the
EPA’s cumulative exposure index (used above in the job trade-off analysis), she discovered that
those California counties with the deepest inequalities of income, wealth, and race also
experienced the highest level of hazards in the county as a whole. Boyce et al. (1999) similarly
find that greater inequalities in power, in this case at the state level, lead to weaker
environmental policies and adverse public health outcomes. In short, EJ struggles to equalize
14

hazard exposure may lower the overall level of pollution: forcing the commons to really be
common may help in clean-up and preservation.
EJ activists have long recognized this potential, partly because they seek to avoid simply shifting
hazards to other neighborhoods and thus straining alliances. As a result, EJ principles tend to
call for source reduction as the ultimate goal, and this in fact has been a primary focus for many
EJ groups (see, for example, Environmental Health Coalition 1998). Other groups have turned
their attention from preventing new hazard location toward the clean-up of lands with a legacy
of toxic uses and their conversion to new productive uses. The latter is the thrust of the
brownfields initiatives in which EJ groups have often played a vital role (see EPA 1999 and
Dixon 2001). This represents a potential marriage between social capital, productive capital,
and natural assets.19
Conclusion: Building Social Capital to Protect Natural Capital
As Boyce (1994) argues, there is a tendency to pose environmental issues in terms of humans
versus nature, a view which feeds into notions of a jobs-environment trade-off. Rather, the issue
– one found both in the realm of the environment and elsewhere in society – is that some groups
of humans are positioned against others, with each group asserting its claim to some form of
capital. Thus, Boyce suggests that any analysis of the environment should ask: (1) who are the
net gainers from an environmentally degrading action (since it would likely not be taken unless
there was a benefit for someone)? (2) who are the losers? and (3) what is it about the
relationship between the winners and the losers that allows this pattern to be sustained?
The siting of toxic hazards, a central concern of the environmental justice movement, is a clear
example where there are winners and losers – and where power seems to matter more than
markets. There remain significant methodological problems in the literature on hazard location,
and debate about techniques and evidence are likely to engage social and natural scientists for
years to come.20 Still, the research reviewed above presents a compelling case that there are
indeed significant disparities in the allocation of hazards, and suggests that these disparities are
better explained by politics than by the impartial operation of markets.
First, recall that environmental toxics are disproportionately located in minority neighborhoods
but are not located in the poorest communities. This suggests that something besides simple
market dynamics is influencing the placement of such hazards. Second, statistical tests in at least
one urban area suggest that placement or siting is far more important than move-in, once again
casting doubt on the simple market story in which minority residents are exercising choice by
trading one asset (cleaner air) for another (lower housing prices). Third, there is also little
evidence of a positive tradeoff between pollution levels and job growth; indeed, the overall
panorama suggests that more pollution leads to fewer jobs.
Finally, social capital may be important in understanding the pattern of environmental inequity
and the state of natural assets. There are indications that areas experiencing the most significant
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demographic change – areas where the social fabric may be temporarily torn – are the most
vulnerable to new siting. And there is additional evidence that where social capital is strongest in
a region or a state – as measured by the equity in the distribution of income and power – the
environment is actually in better shape. As a result, building social capital through EJ organizing
can have a direct impact on building a community’s and society’s natural assets.
Indeed, the EJ movement can be understood as a broad effort to improve the asset base of
poor people of color. It is prompted by environmental concerns but often motivated by
underlying civil rights and social concerns. The original statement of EJ principles from the First
People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit opened with an affirmation of “the
sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity, and the interdependence of all species,” but in
practice, the urban variant of the EJ movement has often been more specifically defined by
opposition to environmental degradation and to racism in public policy, and many of the urban
activists have emerged from the civil rights movement and other multi-racial organizing efforts.
Thus, EJ has often had more to do with the broader social movements for racial and economic
justice than with environmentalism writ small.
In recent years, some dynamic new efforts have brought EJ concerns to a higher policy level,
tying environmental issues to basic economic equity. In Los Angeles, for example, the LaborCommunity Strategies Center cast transportation as an EJ issue, and organized a Bus Riders
Union which successfully sued the local transportation authority, forcing it to curtail spending on
rail development (used more frequently by suburban commuters) and instead to expand the bus
service used primarily by the region’s poor.21 In San Francisco, the Urban Habitat Program
(UHP) has moved from straightforward EJ work to address a wide range of challenges
associated with suburban “sprawl.” Arguing that environment-friendly anti-sprawl efforts can
re-steer development back to the inner city (as in Portland, Oregon; see Rusk 1998, 22), UHP
proposes regional tax-sharing as one element of a solution.
These broad challenges to urban development strategies are an appropriate next step for the EJ
movement. After all, environmental inequity is really part of a larger phenomenon in which older
industries have abandoned central city areas and left a weak job base, concentrated poverty,
and pollution in their wake.22 Community development in urban America will require improving
the asset base on all sides: independent wealth for business formation, available employment for
workers, stronger social capital for communities, and a cleaner natural environment which can
pave the way to both healthier residents and new industrial and other development. By stitching
these concerns together, EJ groups are strengthening social capital and pursuing an asset-based
community-building approach.
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Endnotes
1

Specifically, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) filed suit against an emissionstrading program in which oil firms could maintain dirty refineries if they cleaned up an equivalent
amount of pollution by purchasing and then destroying heavily-polluting older vehicles. While
such trading did yield overall benefits – especially a cleaner air basin at lower dollar costs – it
imposed local burdens by leaving the hazards concentrated in the neighborhoods hosting the
refineries. After CBE sued, the Air Quality Management District was forced to suspend the
program, and the Task Force came into being. For more on CBE’s lawsuit and its specific
impacts, see Kuhn (1999).
2

If the pattern of inequality is perceived rather than actual, it may still have social effects (such
as feelings of disempowerment in public policy processes) but it would seem to have little
impact on the real enjoyment of environmental goods by poor and minority communities. For
more extensive reviews of the EJ literature, see Szasz and Meuser (1997), Bryant and Mohai
(1992), and Foreman (1998); while the first two pieces generally support EJ suppositions,
Foreman (1998) is more skeptical.
3

The earlier U.S. GAO study grew directly out of the protest and was initiated under pressure
from the Congressional Black Caucus. See U.S. GAO (1983).
4

Some have argued that the Anderton et al. studies were biased because they were funded by
a grant from the largest waste management firm in the U.S. As noted, however, these studies
offered significant methodological improvements over earlier research.
5

The story is a bit more complicated. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 mandates that
entities getting federal assistance cannot discriminate. Historically, Title VI has been attractive to
civil rights litigators since it requires that plantiffs demonstrate disparate outcomes rather than
discriminatory intent (which is more difficult and, in the EJ situation, requires an extensive
analysis of actual siting practices and histories). Despite this looser standard, no
environmentally-oriented lawsuit filed solely on these grounds has been successful. Activists
have been able to continue to file administrative complaints through the EPA alleging disparate
impacts under Title VI, as this targets the regulations under the title (see Ramirez and
Stephenson 1998 and also Kracov 1998).
6

As Been (1995) notes, the Anderton et al. (1994a, 1994b) was based on a “dirty” database
in which addresses had not been checked for accuracy, partly because of pure error and partly
because some firms list their business address rather than the site address in various national
databases.
7

It would, however, still be difficult to explain the racial pattern without resorting to either a
hypothesis that risk preferences are different for different groups and/or that housing
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discrimination exists, such that minorities are forced to select housing from a more limited (and
more polluted) pool. While the latter is different than a pure “market dynamics” story, the
problem still lies in the movement of people and not the placing of hazards. Of course, the policy
solution is different: if it is simply choice, then individuals should be provided with full information
regarding local hazards in order to make the best choice; if it is housing discrimination that
‘steers’ minority movers, then this must be addressed through enforcement of existing housing
laws or the enactment of more effective legislation.
8

The degree of toxicity in this case is measured by casting the tracts into three categories: those
that had no air releases as recorded in the Toxic Release Inventory, those that had air releases
that were not on the EPA’s 33/50 list, and those that had 33/50 air releases (see the discussion
in the text). The latter are substance releases identified by the EPA as “high priority” for
reduction. Another categorization, in which the dividing line at the top involves those releases
identified as carcinogenic, yields a slightly different allocation of tract but roughly the same
results for an ordered logit regression on the determinants of location.
9

The technical details of this data construction and the formal econometric results, including
from a simultaneous model, are explained in Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp (forthcoming). The original
file with the 1990 shapes for 1970 and 1980 data was developed by the California Department
of Finance and provided to the author.
10

Given these anemic results for “move-in” effects, we wondered whether changes showed up
more rapidly and then tracts converged to the county average over time. Considering the areas
receiving sites in the 1960s and the effects in the 1970s, we found very marginal evidence of a
relative increase in percent minority, falling blue collar presence, and declining housing values for
the areas within one mile of the sited hazard. For those tracts receiving sites in the 1970s, the
subsequent decade brought a moderately significant increase in percent minority in the one-mile
buffer, a fall in the percent college-educated for both radii of influence, a decline in household
income in the ¼ mile zone, and a surprising increase (at least according to “move-in”
proponents) in home values (and, to a less significant degree, rents) in the one-mile zone. While
the overall pattern offers some modest evidence for the move-in hypotheses – limited increase in
minorities in both ten-year periods, and a fall in housing values in one of the time periods
examined – both the general pattern of statistical insignificance and certain contradictory results
(including a relative decrease in blue collar workers, an increase in housing values, and an
apparent move-out of African-Americans) suggest problems with the “market dynamics” or
choice-driven story. As we note in the text, there is also little evidence for move-in once we nest
the relationships in a multivariate regression analysis.
11

There is a bit of “smoking gun” evidence of the role of politics in placement. A report by
Cerrell Associates, Inc. (1984) which provided advice to the California Waste Management
Board on locating waste incinerators stated that “all socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the
nearby siting of major facilities, but the middle and upper-socioeconomic strata possess better
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resources to effectuate their opposition. Middle and higher-socioeconomic strata neighborhoods
should not fall at least within the one-mile and five-mile radii of the proposed site.”
12

I thank Jim Boyce for pointing me in the direction of this property rights analysis.

13

For example, California’s 1986 Tanner Act requires that governments develop local
assessment committees for siting new TSDFs which would be “broadly constituted to reflect the
makeup of the community.” However, in practice, the “local” community has been defined to
be a large geographic unit, such as a county, and this has allowed the general and diffuse
benefits to overwhelm the concentrated neighborhood costs in the process of making siting
decisions (Cole 1999). For this reason, Schwartz and Wolfe (1999) recommend modifying the
Tanner Act to include a provision that four of the seven committee members be from the
adjacent communities; they also suggest that there be some mandate for minority representation.
14

Of course, until decision-making authority is truly democratic, there is little reason to assume
that pollution outcomes reflect choice and not simply the distribution of power. For this reason,
the most critical element in the EJ agenda is general community empowerment.
15

This geographical unit – larger than the census tract but still sub-county and often sub-city – is
especially appropriate in a metropolitan area like Los Angeles, where the city is spread out and
contains its own suburbs. Indeed, within the city itself, places like Watts may have more in
common with immediately adjoining unincorporated county territories and old industrial suburbs
than they do with the San Fernando Valley or the Westside. The municipal line where South
L.A. abuts the region’s inner-ring suburbs won’t stand in the way of a short commute to
employment or shopping -- but the profound distances within the city between the San
Fernando Valley and East L.A. often will.
16

In Figure 4, I define job growth as a percentage of the 1980 population. Using a base of
1980 jobs shows an even wider disparity: more polluted areas generally have more jobs per
resident, but the relative strength of that job base has been steadily shrinking over time.
17

Some trade-offs no doubt remain, but if we think in several dimensions, we can see another
important point: an increase in one form of capital may improve the balancing act between two
other forms. Imagine a curve describing a community’s preferences between feasible mixes of
environmental protection and job creation. To the extent that a community enjoys political
power rooted in social capital, it can improve outcomes in each area, that is, shift the curve
upward to improve the overall tradeoff.
18

On the international evidence, see, for example, Rodrik (1994) and Birdsall and Londoño
(1997); on the evidence for U.S. regions, see, for example, Savitch et al. (1993), Barnes and
Ledebur (1998), and Pastor, Dreier, Grigsby, and Lopez-Garza (2000).
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While some business critics have worried that the involvement of EJ groups would make
brownfields development contentious, the opposite has been the case: a recent EPA study of
seven of its Brownfields Pilot Study sites found that sites with active environmental justice
movements were less likely to result in filings under Title VI because communities were involved
early in planning for Brownfields reuse (see US EPA 1999).
20

New models will have to take better account of innovations in geographic research (see
Bowen 1999) and analyses will need to go beyond the simple presence of pollutants to more
exactly specify the relationship between proximity and exposure on the one hand, and exposure
and risk on the other. Attempts to quantify the hazard effect on health indicators is underway;
see, for example, Morello-Frosch (1997).
21

For more on transportation issues, see Center for Community Change (1998) and Hodge
(1995); for more on the L.A. experience, see Mann (1996).
22

20

For a full explication of this argument, see Pastor (2000).
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Figure 2
TSDFs Placed During 1970s and 1980s
and Ethnic Churning-- Los Angeles County
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Figure 3
Los Angeles County--PUMAs

Sy lm a r
Pac oim a
ri dg e

S un Val ley
La C an ada

Sepu lv eda

E nc in o

V an
N uys

Nor th
Bur ba nk
Holl yw ood

G le nda le

La Ver neCl ar em on t

Pas ad ena
Arc adi a
Holl yw ood
Bel Air - Brentw ood
Bev erly
Hi lls

Mi rac le M ile

W e stlak e

D ow ntow n

W e stw ood
Adam s
Culv e r
Ci ty
Ven ic e

Ver mon t

Mo nter ey
P ark

Eas t
L.A.

Pico
Ri ve ra

Bel l

Azu sa- Balw in Pk

El
Mon te

Cov in a
Pom ona
Ind us try

W a ln ut

W hitti er
Diam on d Bar

Ingl ewoo d

Garden a

07 .apr or
07 .doc

Alham b ra

Cen tr al
Av e
Hu nt.
Park
Sou th
Gate

H aw thor ne

{E l Segund o
{H e rm o sa Be ac h
{
{P alos Verde s

E agl e
R ock

To rr anc e

D ow ney
La M ir ad a

C om pton
A rtes ia C er ri tos
B el lfl owe r
Ca rs on

Lon g
B eac h
Ha rbor
Ci ty

ngB
o
L
ea
ch

P u m a .s hp
lea s t p ol lu ted
m od era te ly p ol luted
he a vi l y pol lu ted

N

(drop this page – it’s only here to make Word happy)

